Why do we bet in poker? The reason of betting.

[Mick Clausen]

No i did not write this, but it comes from one of the best books ever made. And i posted it cause wookie asked bout something related in another post..

Chapter One: The Reasons for Betting

I hope you’re ready for this, because we’re about to define our entire poker existence.

It’s a simple word: why? Poor players never question their decisions. Average players start to

ask themselves “why” but have wildly insufficient answers. When I’m coaching students, this is

one of the first things I see that needs fixing. A student makes a bet, and I ask him why he’s

betting. Common answers include: “I’m pretty sure I have the best hand,” “I’m gaining

information to see where I’m at,” or “I’m betting to protect my hand.” The problem is that those

aren’t reasons for betting. Things like information or protection may be side effects of betting,

but they’re not reasons. So what are the reasons for betting? There are only three. In order to

justify a bet or raise at any time, we’ll need to rely on these three (and only these three) reasons.

We’ll deal with the first two first:

1) Value. This is defined as betting to get called (or raised) by a worse hand. Betting just

because you probably have the best hand is NOT sufficient to bet for value.

2) Bluff. This is defined as betting to get a better hand to fold. Betting just because you

can’t win any other way is NOT sufficient to bet as a bluff.

These two are pretty simple. They rely on mistakes our opponents make—either calling too

much or folding too much. It’s human nature to call too much. We’re curious beings and we

want to see what the other guy holds, what the turn card will be, whether or not we hit our flush

on the river.

People are more inclined to make the mistake of calling too much than the mistake of folding

too much.

Therefore, reason #1 for betting will dominate our bets. Value-betting is, was, and always

will be the best way to make money. At a micro-stakes game, let’s say $25nl, nearly everyone at

the table will call absurdly often, so reason #2 for betting becomes more or less useless. At

$5000nl, nearly everyone at the table will be good enough to avoid paying off your value bets

too often, and thus reason #1 decreases in utility and reason #2 becomes more important. In

general, though, even regulars at high stakes games are more likely to make bad calls than bad

folds as a general rule.

So what about c-betting? Let’s say we raised KQo on the button, and the big blind (a loose,

passive player who won’t fold ANY pair on the flop) calls us. The flop comes down A75r. He

checks to us. This is a very standard bet. Why?

Hmm. We can’t get called by any worse hands (QJ isn’t coming along for the ride). Even a

hand like 86 is roughly a coin-flip against us in terms of equity. So we can’t bet for value.

Sticking with our assumption that he’s not folding any pairs, we can’t bet as a bluff either as we

have the best non-pair hand possible. Yet we still bet. Why?

3) Capitalization of Dead Money. This is defined as making the opponent fold, whether his

hand is better or worse, and collecting the money in the pot.

This is obviously a fair amount trickier than reasons #1 or #2. What makes this

mysterious third reason work?

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a) We make him fold his equity share in the pot. On the A75 flop where we hold KQ, if

the opponent holds JT, his six-outer still has a strong amount of equity to draw out.

Making him fold that equity share is good.

(One exception would be if the villain is likely to bluff AND our hand is strong

enough to call a potential bluff. On this A75 board, if we check behind on the flop,

villain is likely to check all of his air-type hands and bet all of his pair-or-better

hands. Thus, villain is unlikely to bluff and our hand isn’t strong enough to be a bluff

catcher, so we can’t check behind. More on this concept later in the section titled

“Showdown Theory.”)

b) The dead money more than compensates for the times when we’re called and lose. I

was playing at a high stakes table with a very famous, extremely loose-aggressive

player named Cole. He was deepstacked in the CO, covered by the Button. Cole

raised, the Button 3-bet, he 4-bet, the Button 5-bet, and he shoved all-in. The Button

folded, and Cole showed T9o. Cole obviously wasn’t raising all-in for value (hard to

get called by nine-high). Nor could he be confident about making the Button fold

anything good, as Cole is famously loose and aggressive—nobody folds anything

good to Cole. Yet he still raised. Why? After the button 5-bets, there is a TON of

dead money in the pot. Cole only needs the Button to fold a relatively small

percentage to make the shove correct

As games get more aggressive, more people are bluffing and putting money in with

weaker hands. That equates to the presence of more dead money in the pot. In small stakes

games, c-betting may be the extent of your reason #3 betting (as in KQ on an A75 board). This

is because people rarely get out of line and make plays without some kind of hand. In higher

stakes, more aggressive games, you’ll need to capitalize on dead money if you want to turn a

profit.

Additionally, reason #3 is rarely (possibly never) a primary reason for betting. Often

times it is used as a complimentary reason for reasons #1 and #2. For example, let’s say we have

the nut flush draw on a T♠8♠4♣K♣ board and we decide to bet the turn. Well, we’re betting for

reason #2, hoping for him to fold a hand like JT or A8. He may have a worse hand, such as a

worse flush draw, which we don’t want him to fold necessarily. However, the fact that there is

money in the pot, and we might get him to fold a hand like JT means that it’s not so bad for him

to fold a worse hand. Another example might be a situation where we have KT and the board is

T♠6♠5♣J♣. Betting again might be slightly too thin (more explanation of this in the section

titled “Bet Sizing and Thin Value”). However, getting him to fold straight draws, flush draws,

and random floats is good for us, especially if we think he usually takes a free card with his

draws if we check.

In general, dead money compensates for the “thinness” of either reason #1 or reason #2.

For example, a bluff might be too thin (i.e. villain calls us too often) when the pot is 50bb.

However, if the pot were 100bb, a bluff has more value because there’s more dead money to

make. Similarly, a thin value bet might be too thin with a small pot size, but with a larger pot the

dead money compensates. In this sense, we’re always betting for reason #1 or reason #2, but

reason #3 is always involved. Even when we raise preflop, we’re either raising as a bluff or for

value, but our raise is compensated by the dead money—dead money that we call “the blinds.”

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So what about protection? Is this not a reason for betting?

The answer is no—protection is a consequence of betting. Let’s say our hand is red QQ

on a Q♠T♠9♣ board. We bet for value—there are many worse hands that will call or raise us.

The fact that we’re charging draws and “protecting” is nice, but it’s hardly the original

motivation for our bet. Now let’s say we hold 6♥6♦ on a Q♥9♥3♣ board. We can bet there to

collect dead money, but we’re hardly “protecting.” Most draws are either 50/50 against us or are

a significant favorite (A♥J♥ comes to mind). The moral of the story is that when we have a set

of Queens, our hand needs protection, but it needs value first and foremost. When we have a

pair of sixes, our hand doesn’t really need protection because it’s not very strong. All we have is

a pair of sixes. It seems pretty dumb to protect ourselves from A♥J♥ when A♥J♥ is a favorite

over us. Instead, we might bet 66 on the Q♥9♥3♣ board as a thin bluff (against hands like 77 or

88) or for thin value (against a hand like A♥4♥), but mostly to collect dead money against a hand

like A♣T♣ that will fold its 6-outer on the flop.

What about information? Let’s say we have QJ on a QT5r board against a very loosepassive

player. We bet for value. If he calls, we have the information that our hand is probably

best and we can keep betting for value. If he raises, we have the information that our hand is

behind his range and we should fold. However, the bet is still good even if that happens, because

it was for value. The real problem with betting for information occurs when someone bets a

hand like KK on an A22 board. Well, every time we’re called we’re behind, so we lose some

money (more on this later). Every time he folds we were ahead. He plays perfectly. And, if

he’s not making any mistakes, we’re not making any money. If we’re betting for information

instead of one of the three reasons, we’re usually isolating ourselves with better hands and

folding out worse hands. In short, we’re making mistakes and our opponent isn’t. And that’s

bad.

However, let’s consider the KK on A22 example again. Let’s start with a two

assumptions: 1) if we bet, villain never calls with a worse hand, and 2) if we check, villain

NEVER bluffs. In this case, it may still be correct to bet to collect dead money. Let’s say that

villain holds a hand like 44. If he’s never bluffing when we check, we’re simply giving him

infinite odds to catch his 4. So, betting to make 44 fold there is a good thing, because we make

him fold his equity share in a spot where he only puts money in the pot when he’s value betting.

Obviously, these two assumptions are never this concrete—sometimes we can bet KK for value

on an A22 board against smaller pairs, and sometimes our villain will bluff us like crazy if we

check. But, we need to remain conscious of dead money as it applies to these types of situations.

So now we have the three reasons. Any time you’re betting, ask yourself, “Why am I

betting?” Once you realize that there are only three answers, poker will suddenly make a lot

more sense.

[Mark Aisenberg]

To me, betting as a bluff is when your hand is behind villains range. Like I said, it is all semantics but I classify it like this. And I am not saying that you are wrong to classify it how you do, just saying that this is how I classify it:

Value Bet: When you are ahead of villains current range and would be ahead of villains calling/raising range
Protection Bet: When you are ahead of villains current range and would be behind villains calling/raising range but still it is more positive ev to bet rather than check because his folding range (which has some equity) is so large relative to his calling/raising range
Bluff: When you are behind your villains current range but the villains folding range + your equity vs. villains calling/raising range is more positive ev than checking/check-folding

Winnie said:

Yes I got lost in your numbers :p.
But you are still missing the point, as I said your hand becomes a bluff in essence, your hand's equity has NO contribution AT ALL to your profits. You can have any hand in this situation.
As the author put it: the protection might be a consequence of betting. You are betting as a bluff since you expect villain to fold. Betting with the expectation of a fold is not protecting. A call/raise would be -EV for you anytime.

I know that you have to make the bet big enough to give him bad odds, but primarily you are still betting to get a fold, so protection is a consequence here. You're bluffing with most likely the best hand.


Mark Aisenberg said:

Imo there's not even any protection going on here, since you'll just be isolating one bluff and two hands you beat, but villain folds so often that it gets profitable. -winnie

That is the definition of betting to protect your hand.

[Winnie]

You're right it's just terminology. Though here it would be good to add air hands to your range so you can very profitably go full out bluffmode.

[Mark Aisenberg]

Oh, I totally agree. Against an opponent who is folding this high, you don't need to be ahead, you can clearly be bluffing profitably too.

Winnie said:

You're right it's just terminology. Though here it would be good to add air hands to your range so you can very profitably go full out bluffmode.

[Mark Aisenberg]

Okay, I have a great, simple example of protection betting. You have A3 of spades, your hand was accidentally exposed and your opponent knows exactly what you have. You have a half pot bet left in your stack when on the turn you hit your nut flush. The board:

Kd8s6s 4s

Your opponents range is mainly made up of hands that are drawing dead but he has one combo of 5s7s and 12 set combos in his hand which each have 20% equity.

Here, we shove in what is remaining in our stack as a protection bet. He has to fold out his 12 set hands because he isn't getting enough of a price and we only get called by better, 5s7s, which we are drawing dead against.

If we move all-in, we net 11.5 pots, if we check we net 8.6 pots.

To recap, a protection bet is that we are ahead of his current range but behind his calling/raising range.